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THREEMODELS OF RETIREMENT:
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY VERSUS PREDICTIVE VALIDITY
ABSTRACT
Empirical analysis often raises questions of approximationto
underlying individual behavior. Closer approximationmay require
more complex statistical specifications, On the otherhand, more
complex specifications may presume computationalfacility that is
beyond the grasp of most real people and therefore lessconsistent
with the actual rules that govern theirbehavior, even though
economic theory may push analysts to increasinglymore complex
specifications. Thus the issue is not only whethermore complex
models are worth the effort, but also whetherthey are better.
We compare the in—sample andout-of—sample predictive
performance of three models of retirement ——"optionvalue,"
dynamic programming, and probit --todetermine which of the
retirement rules most closely matches retirementbehavior in a
large firm.The primary measure of predictivevalidity is the
correspondence between the model predictions and actual retirement
under the firm's temporary early retirement windowplan.The
"option value" and dynamic programming models areconsiderably more
successful than the less complex probit model inapproximating the
rules individuals use to make retirementdecisions, but the more
complex dynamic programming rule approximates behaviorno better
than the simpler option value rule.
Robin L. Luxnsdajrie James H. Stock
Department of Economics Kennedy School of
Harvard University Government
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Empirical analysis often raises questions of approximation to underlying
individual behavior. Closer approximation may require more complex
statistical specifications. On the other hand, more complex specifications
may presume computational facility that is beyond the grasp of most real
people and therefore less consistent with the actual rules that govern their
behavior, even though economic theory may lead analysts to increasingly
complex specifications. Thus the issue is not only whether more complex
models are worth the effort, but also whether they are better. The answer
must necessarily depend on the behavior that the analysis is intended to
predict. We consider in this paper the relationship between computational
complexity and the predictive validity of three models of retirement behavior.
Retirement has been the subject of a large number of studies over the
past decade. Most have emphasized the effect of Social Security (SS)
provisions on retirement age, but have used a wide range of methods. The
earlier studies in this time period were based on regression or multinomial
logit analysis.1 Subsequent analysis relied on non-linear budget constraint
formulations of the retirement decision2 and on proportional hazard model
*Financjal support was provided by the National Instituteon Aging, grant
numbers R37 AC08146 and T32 AGOO186, the Hoover Institution, the National
Science Foundation, and the Sloan Foundation.
1See Hurd and Boskiri [1981], forexample.
2See Burtless [1986] and Gustman andSteinmejer [1986], for example.(2)
formulations.3 More recently, several authors havedeveloped models that
focus on forward-looking comparison of the advantages of retirement at
alternative ages in the future and on the updating of information as persons
age. Although the spirit of these latter models is basically the same, they
vary widely in computational complexity. The potential advantages in
predictive validity of the computationally more complex versions of these
models is the primary motivation for this study, although to broaden the scope
of the comparison we consider a much simpler model as well.
We compare the predictive validity of three models of retirement. The
first is a simple probit model. The second is the "option value" model
developed in Stock and Wise [1990a, 1990b]. The third is a stochastic dynamic
prograsuning model. We experiment with two versions of this model: one is an
adaptation of the extreme value distribution formulation proposed by gerkovec
and Stern [1988] and the other is the normal distribution formulation proposed
by Daula and Moffitt (1989]. A related but still more complex model has been
developed by Rust (1989], but we have not attempted to implement his
formulation in the analysis in this paper.
The analysis is guided by several key ideas. First, all of the models
are theoretical abstractions; none of them can be reasonably thought of as
"true." The important consideration is which decision rule is the best
approximation to the calculations that govern actual individual behavior. In
this paper, judgments on which rule is best are based on empirical evidence on
the relationship between model specification and predictive validity.
3See Hausman and Wise [1985], forexample.(3)
Second, the models vary substantially in the computational complexity of
the decision rules that they attribute to individual decision makers. The
option value and the dynamic programming rules are both intended tocapture
the same underlying idea, but implementation of dynamicprogramming rules
typically implies considerably more computational complexity than
implementation of the option value rule. The option value model makesa
simplifying assumption that substantially reduces complexity. The probit
model is much simpler than either of these.
Third, although the mathematically correct implementation of some
decision rules requires dynamic programming, there is no singledynamic
programming rule. The implied computational complexity depends importantly on
specific assumptions, in particular the disturbance term correlation
structure. It is easier to incorporate more flexible correlationassumptions
in the option value than in the dynamicprogramming formulations. Thus, for
example, the option value specification may be a suboptimal solution toa
dynamic programming rule that implies computational complexity difficultto
implement even with a computer.
Thus a question of practical importance is whether differentdecision
rules yield significantly different results.
The comparisons in this paper are made byestimating the models on the
same data. The data, which pertain to the retirement decisions ina large
Fortune 500 firm, have two important advantages forour purposes: first, the
retirement decisions can be related to the provisions of the firm'spension
plan, so that it is possible to simulate the effect ofchanges in the pension
plan provisions. Second, the firm offered an unanticipated window'plan in
one of the years covered by the data.(4)
The principal measure of the predictive validity of the models is how
well they predict the effects of the window plan. Like the typical defined
benefit pension plan, this firm's plan provides substantial incentives to
retire early. In addition, the window plan provided further incentive to
retire early. Window plans, which have been offered by many firms in recent
years, provide special bonuses to workers in a specific group -.oftendefined
by age, occupational group, or even a division within the firm --ifthe
worker retires within a specified period of time, typically a year or less.
The window plan allows a unique external test of the predictive validity of
the models; it is possible to compare model predictions against actual.
retirement rates under the window plan.
We begin by obtaining model parameter estimates based on retirement
decisions in a year (1980) prior to the window plan. We then use these
estimates to predict retirement in a later year (1982) under the window plan.
The estimates and predictions are based on male non-managerial employees.
A brief description of the firm plan, the special window plan, and the
data is presented in section I. A more detailed description, borrowed in
large part from Lumsd.aine, Stock, and Wise [l989a], is provided in appendix A.
The models that are compared are explained in section II.The parameter
estimates and window plan predictions are presented in section III. Section
IV presents simulations of the effects of eliminating the Social Security
early retirement option. Conclusions are presented in section V.
I.The Data, the Firm Pension Plan, and the Temporary Window.
The analysis is based on a random sample of 993 male non-managerial
office employees at a Fortune 500 firm. They were employed at the firm and(5)
were at least 50 years old on January 1, 1980, and had been employed by the
firmforat least three years prior to 1980.(The criterion that they be
employed three years facilitates the forecasting of future wage earnings on an
individual basis.)4
The data, obtained from firm records, include the earnings history of
each employee from his year of employment or from 1969 if he was employed
before then, to retirement, or to 1983 if he had not retired by then. The
data allow determination of whether the employee continued to work at the firm
in successive years from 1980 through 1984. The data do not include the
employment status of workers who left the firm; some employees probably took
another job after departure from this firm. Thus strictly speaking, the data
pertain to departure from the firm rather than retirement, but because we have
no information on post retirement employment we treat departure as retirement.
The firm's employees are covered by a defined benefit pension plan. The
plan provides substantial incentive for the typical employee to remain in the
firm until age 55 and then an additional incentive to leave the firm before
age 65. The plan provisions are described in detail in appendix A. It has
four key features:
1. The "normal" retirement age is 65.
2. Workers are vested after ten years of service.
3. The early retirement age is 55: a worker who departs beforeage 55
receives benefits that are reduced actuarially (approximately 7
percent per year) from the normal retirement age benefits, but the
benefits of an employee who rvtires at 55 or later are reduced only
about 3 percent per year, thus creating an incentive to stay until 55
and then an incentive to leave the firm.
4Employees who died between 1980 and 1982 before retiringwere not
included in the sample.(6)
4. The benefit formula incorporates a social security offset -- a
reduction of firm benefits based on social security benefits -•but
the offset is waived until age 65 for persons who retire at 55 or
later, thus creating an additional incentive for workers to retire
between 55 and 65.
In addition, an employee accrues a benefit entitlement from Social Security
(SS), with early retirement at age 62 and normal retirement at 65.
Particularly important for this study is the firm's 1982 window plan.
Under the window plan, the firm offered non-managerial office employees a
temporary retirement incentive. The window plan applied to employees between
55 and 65 who were vested in the firm's pension plan, and to all employees
over 65. Employees who retired in 1982 were offered a bonus equivalent to 3
to 12 months salary. Although the exact bonus varied by years of service, it
was typically largest for employees who were between 58 and 62 years old and
was smallest for those 55 and 65. Of the 993 employees in our sample, 800
remained in the firm until 1982. The actual 1982 departure rates of these 800
employees are used to assess the out-of-sample predictive validity of the
three retirement models.
II. The Models
Three retirement models are described, beginning with the "option value"
model. The simple probit model is explained next and then the dynamic
programmingspecification.
5Fora detailed description of this window plan and a discussion of the
design of efficient window plans, see Lumsdaine, Stock,and Wise [l989b.(7)
A.The Option Value Model.
The conceptual model is discussed in some detail in Stock and Wise
(1990aJ. It is described only briefly here. At any given age, based on
information available at that age, it is assumed that an employee compares the
expected present value of retiring at that age with the value of retiring at
each age in the future through age 70, which is the mandatory retirement age
in this firm. The maximum of the expected present values of retiring at each
future age, minus the expected present value of immediate retirement is called
the option value of postponing retirement. A person who does not retire this
year maintains the option of retiring at a more advantageous age later on.If
the option value is positive, the person continues to work; otherwise he
retires. With reference to appendix figure A-i, for example, at age 50 the
employee would compare the value of the retirement benefits that he would
receive were he to retire then --approximately$28,000 --withthe value of
wage earnings and retirement benefits in each future year. The expected
present value of retiring at 60 (discounted to age 50), for example, is about
$184,000. This calculation is repeated as the worker ages, using updated
predictions of future wage earnings, and related pension and Social Security
benefits. Future earnings forecasts are based on the individual's past
earnings, as well as the earnings of other persons in the firm.6 The precise
model specification follows.
A person at age twhocontinues to work will earn Y in subsequent years
s. If the person retires at age r, subsequent retirement benefits will be
B5(r). These benefits will depend on the person's age and years of service at
6See Stock and Wise [1990a] fora description of the earnings forecasts.(8)
retirement and on his earnings history; thus they are a function of the
retirement age. We suppose that in deciding whether to retire the person
weighs the indirect utility that will be received from future income.
Discounted to age tatthe rate ,thevalue of this future stream of income
if retirement is at age r is given by
(1) V(r) Z'w('s) +_8sUr(Bs(r)),
where U(Y5) is the indirect utility of future wage income and Ur(Bs(r)) is
the indirect utility of future retirement benefits. It is assumed that the
employee will not live past age S.




Letting r* be the age that gives the maximum gain, the person will postpone
retirement if the option value, Gt(r*), is positive,
(3) Gt(r*) —EtVt(r*)
-EtV(t)>0




where and are individual-specific random effects, assumed to follow a
Markovian (first order autoregressive) process
(Sa) — +, E51(e)—0
(Sb) s —s-l+sE5_1(5) —0
The parameter k is to recognize that in considering whether to retire the
utility associated with a dollar of income while retired may be different from
the utility associated with a dollar of income accompanied by work.
Abstracting from the random terms, at any given age s, the ratio of the
utility of retirement to the utility of employment is [k(B5/Y5fl7.
Given this specification, the function Gt(r) can be decomposed into two
components
(6) G(r) —g(r)+
whereg(r) and (r) distinguish the terms in Gt(r) containing the random
effects, w and ,fromthe other terms. If whether the person is alive in
future years is statistically independent of his earnings stream and the





where (sIt) denotes the probability that the person will be alive in year s,
given that he is alive in year t.Giventhe random Markov assumption, (r)
can be written as
(8) (r) —
— K(r)v
where K(r) —p)tr(slt)and — - Thesimplification
results from the fact that at time ttheexpected value of — -is
for all future years s.(The term K(r) cumulates the deflators that
yield the present value in year tofthe future expected values of the random
components of utility. The further r is in the future, the larger is K(r).
That is, the more distant the potential retirement age, the greater the
uncertainty about it, yielding a heterosked.astic disturbance term.)G(r)may
thus be written simply as
(9) G(r) —g(r)+K(r)v
If the employee is to retire in year t,G(r)must be less than zero for
every potential retirement age r in the future. If 4isthe r that yields
the maximum value of g(r)/K(r). the probability of retirement becomes(11)
(10) Pr[Recire in year t]—Pr[g(r)/K(r)<-vs]
If retirement in only one year is considered, this expression is all that is
needed.
More generally, retirement decisions. may be considered over two or more
consecutive years. In this case the retirement probabilities are simply an
extension of equation (10). The probability that a person who is employed at









Thisis a multinomial discrete choice probability with dependent error terms
V5.
Finally,we assume that follows a Gaussian Markov process, with
(13) — +E' i.i.d.(12)
where the initial value, v, is i.i.d. N(O,c72) and is independent of The
covariance between and is pvar(I'), and the variance of for r >t
j(p2(Tt))2 +(f•t-l2i)2
The estimates in this paper are based on retirement decisions in only one
year and the random terms in equation (5) are assumed to follow a random walk,
with p —1.In this case, the covariance between &'and is var(l/r), and
the variance of iforr tis2 +(r-t)u2.Prior estimates show that
one- and multiple-year estimates are very similar.7
3. The Probit Modal.
The option value model proposes that a person will continue to work if
the option value of postponing retirement -- givenby Ct(r*) —EtVt(r*)
-
EtV(t)in equation (3) -- isgreater than zero. In that model, the option
value is determined by estimation. That is, the observed retirement decisions
* aredescribed in terms of Pr(G(r )>0],which in turn is described by a
particular parameterization of Vt(r). The maximum likelihood estimation
procedure determines these parameters -', k,,anda (and a if two or more
consecutive years are used in estimation). Thus one can think of this
procedure as estimating the option value, based on how employees value future
income and leisure.
Analternativeapproach is to specify retirement in terms of the gain
from continuing to work, but to calculate the gain based on an assumed
7Estimates based on several consecutiveyears and withpestimatedare
shown in Stock and Wise [1990a]. These generalizations have little effect on
theestimates.(13)
valuation of income (determined by -y and k) and an assumed discount rate (a),
insteadof estimating them. Assuming that retirement depends on this
calculated option value, as well as other unobserved determinants of
retirement, a standard specification of retirement is
(14) Pr(Retire in year t] —Pr[60+6lGt(r*)+c>0]
where Gt(r*) is the option value calculated under the presumed parameter
values, and assuming the random components of G(r) ((r) in (6) and (7b))
are all zero. This is a probit formulation, assuming that has a normal
distribution.
In this case, the effect of the assumed gain from retirement is estimated
by the parameter 81. This formulation is the closest probit counterpart to
the option value model. In addition to this specification, several others are
also estimated. The alternative specifications predict retirement on the
basis of SS benefits, pension benefits, the present value of SS benefits (SS
wealth), the present value of pension benefits (pension wealth), the change in
the present value of SS benefits from working another year (SS accrual), the
change in the present value of pension benefits from working another year
(pension accrual), predicted earnings in the next year, and age.
C. The Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model.
The key simplifying assumption in the Stock-Wise option value model is
that the retirement decision is based on the maximtlm of the expected present
values of future utilities if retirement occurs now versus each of the
potential future ages. The stochastic dynamic programming rule considers
instead the expected value of the maximum of current versus future options.(14)
The expected value of the maximum of a series of random variables will be
greater than the maximum of the expected values. Thus to the extent that this
difference is large, the Stock-Wise option value rule underestimates the value
of postponing retirement. And to the extent that the dynamic programming rule
is more consistent with individual decisions than the option value rule, the
Stock-Wise rule may undervalue individual assessment of future retirement
options. Thus we consider a model that rests on the dynamic programming rule.
As emphasized above, it is important to understand that there is no
single dynamic programming model. Because the dynamic programming decision
rule evaluates the maximum of future disturbance terms, its implementation
depends importantly on the error structure that is assumed. Like other users
of this model, we assume an error structure -- andthus a behavioral rule --
thatsimplifies the dynamic programming calculation. In particular, although
the option value model allows correlated disturbances, the random disturbances
in the dynamic programming model are assumed to be uncorrelated, except for a
random individual effect that is used in some specifications. Thus the two
models are not exactly comparable. Whether one rule is a better approximation
to reality than the other may depend not only on the basic idea, but on its
precise implementation.
In fact, we implement two versions of the dynamic programming model. In
the first model, disturbance terms are assumed to follow an extreme value
distribution. This model is adopted from Berkovec and Stern [1988], with two
modifications: first Berkovec and Stern consider three outcomes (full time
work, part time work, and retirement) whereas we consider only two (full time
work and retirement, the only states for which we have data). Second, the way(15)
that we accotmt for individual-specific effects differs from the Berkovec and
Stern formulation.
In the second dynamic programming model, the disturbances are assumed to
be normally distributed. This formulation is adopted from the Daula and
Moffitt (1989] dynamic programming model of retention in the military. Our
model generalizes their specification by allowing for additive individual-
specific disturbances and by specifying retirement in terms of a parameterized
utility function. With the additional assumption that the unobserved
individual-specific effects are normally distributed across employees, the
error structure in this dynamic programming specification is similar to the
structure in the option value model. In both cases, future errors are
normally distributed with non-zero covariances. In the option value model the
covariance structure derives from the random walk assumption; in the dynamic
programming model, the covariances derive from a components of variance
structure, with an individual-specific effect.
A more general dynamic programming model of retirement has been developed
by Rust [1989]. Unfortunately, comparison with his model is beyond the scope
of this study. He assumes that an employee optimizes jointly over bothage of
retirement and future consumption. By admitting continuous and discrete
choice variables, his model poses substantially greater numerical complexity
than the ones we implement.
In most respects our dynamic programmingmodel is analogous to the option
valuemodel. As in that model, at age tanindividualisassumed to derive
utilityU(Y) + lt fromearned income or Ur(Bt(s)) +E2t fromretirement
benefits,where s is the retirement age. The disturbances and are
randomperturbations tothese age-specific utilities. Unlike the additive(16)
disturbances in the option value model, these additive disturbances in the
dynamicprogramming model are assumed to be independent. Future income and
retirement benefits are assumed to be nonrandom; there are no errors in
forecasting future wage earnings or retirement benefits.
Individualspresumably will have different preferences for employment
versus retirement. Variation in preferences is allowed for in the extreme
value distribution version of our model by including individual-specific
effects in and U(.). They are assumed to be fixed for each person, but
vary randomly from person to person. Berkovec and Stern modeled these
individual-specific effects as additional additive errors. In the extreme-
valuedistributionversion of our model they enter multiplicatively. In the
normal distribution version of our model, the random fixed effects enter
additively, as explained below.
1.TheModel.
The dynamic programming model is based on the recursive representation of
the value function. At the beginning of year t, the individual has two
choices: retire now and derive utility from future retirement benefits, or
work for the year and derive utility from income while working during the year
andretaining theoption to choose the best of retirement or work in the next
year. Thus the value function at time t is defined as
(15) W —max(E[U(Y)+ lt + t+l1' Et(_tTt(Ur(3r(t)) +
with —max(E+1[U(Y÷i)+ lt+l +
Et+l[Et+ltl(TJr(Br(t+1)) +
etc. ..(17)
where fiisthe discount factor and, as in the option value model, S is the
year beyond which the person will not live.
Because the errors Eit are assumed to be i.i.d. Eci+—O for r>0. In
addition, in computing expected values, each future utility must be discounted
by the probability of realizing it, i.e. ,bythe probability of surviving to
year r given that the worker is alive in year t, (rJt). With these
considerations, the expression (15) can be written as
—max(Wi+'it, 2t + £2t) ,where
(16) lt —U(Y)+ (t+lIt)EWt+1
The worker chooses to retire in year t if lt÷lt < 2t'-2t otherwise he
continues working. The probability that the individual retires is
Pr[Wl+El < W2+Et]. If a person works until the mandatory retirement age
(70), he retires and receives expected utility W2.
2.Recursions and computation.
With a suitable assumption on the distribution of the errors the
expression (16) provides the basis for a computable recursion for the
nonstochastic terms in the value function. The extreme value and normal
distribution versions of the model are considered in turn.
a.Extreme Value Errors. Following Berkovec and Stern [1988}, the
are assumed to be i.i.d. draws from an extreme value distribution with scale
parameter .Then,for the years preceding mandatory retirement, these
assumptions together with equation (16) imply that(18)
EtW÷1/ —t+l
(17) —
1e+ ln[exp(W1+i/a) + exp(W2t+i/)]
—+ + exp(W2t+i/o)]
where is Euler's constant. Thus (17) can be solved by backwards recursion,
with the terminal value coming from the terminal condition that —
Theextreme value distributional assumption provides a closed form
expression for the probability of retirement in year t:
(18) Pr[Retire in year t] —Pr[1t+ lt < + 2t1
—exp(2t/a)/(exp(W1/c)+ exp 2t"
b.Gaussian Errors. Following Daula and Moffitt [19891 the are
assumed to be independent draws from an N(O,a2) distribution. The Gaussian
assumption provides a simple expression for the probability of retiring:
(19) Pr(Retire in year t] — < (W2t-Wlt)/J) —
whereat —(2t-lt)/Ja.Then the recursion (16) becomes:
(20) EtWt+i/a —t+l
—(1t+i/c)(1-(at+i))+ (W2+1/ci)(a+t) +
where (.)denotesthe standard normal density, and (.)denotesthe
cumulative normal distribution function. As in (19), (a) is the probability(19)
that the person retires in year tandreceives utility W2, plus utility from
E(E2t I <W2W1.The latter term, plus a comparable term when
the person continues to work, yields the last term in equation (20).
3. Individual-specific effects.
Individual-specific terms are modeled as random effects but are assumed
to be fixed over time for a given individual. They enter the two versions of
the dynamic programming models in different ways. Each is discussed in turn.
a. Extreme Value Errors. Single year utilities are
(21a) 1J(Yt) —
(2lb) —
where is constant over time for the same person but random across
individuals. Specifically, it is assumed that ,isa lognormal random
variable with mean one and scale parameter A: —exp(Az+½.X2),where z is
i.i.d. N(O,l). A larger A implies greater variabilityamongemployee tastes
for retirement versus work; when A—0 there is no variation and all employees
havethe same taste.
b. Normal Errors. In this case, the unobserved individual components
are assumed to enter additively, with
(22a) U(Yt) — +c
(22b) U(B(s)) —(kB(s))7(20)
where 'y and k are nonrandom parameters, as above, but is a random additive
taste for work, assumed to distributed N(0,A2). When A —0,there is no taste
variation.
In summary:thedynamic programming models are given by the general
recursion equation (15). It is implemented as shown in equation (17) under
the assumption that the Eit are i.i.d. extreme value, and as shown in equation
(20) under the assumption that it are i.i.d. normal. The retirement
probabilities are computed according to equations (18) and (19) respectively.
The fixed effects specifications are given by equations (21) and (22). The
unknown parameters to be estimated are (-y,k,$,o,A).Becauseof the different
distributional assumptions, the scale parameter is not comparable across
option value or dynamic proramminz models, and A is not comparable across the
two dynamic prorammirtg models.
III. Results.
The option value and the dynamic programming specifications yield quite
similar results and both provide rather good predictions of retirement
behavior under the window plan. The probit specifications yield very poor
predictions of retirement under the window plan, although some specifications
fit the sample data well. The parameter estimates are discussed first,
together with standard measures of fit. We then graphically describe the
correspondence between predicted versus actual retirement behavior, with
emphasis on out-of-sample predictions of retirement under the 1982 window
plan.(21)
A.Parameter estimates.
1. The Probit Model.
The parameter estimates for several probit specifications are shown in
table 1. The variables are defined as follows:
Option value: Ct(r*) calculated as described in Section II.A with -y— 1,
k—1,and fi— .95.
Age: age in years.
Income: the predicted wage earnings in the following year, if the person
continues to work.
SS pv (present value): the predicted present value of entitlement to
future SS benefits, were the person to retire at the beginning of the
year, SS wealth.
Pension pv (present value): the predicted present value of entitlement
to future firm pension benefits, were the person to retire at the
beginning of the year, pension wealth.
55 accrual: the predicted change in the present value of entitlement to
future SS benefits, were the person to continue to work for another year.
Pension acc (accrual): the predicted change in the present value of
entitlement to future firm pension benefits, were the person to continue
to work for another year.
The parameter estimates are with respect to the probability that a person
will retire. Thus the negative option value coefficient in specification 1
indicates that the greater the option value of continuing to work the less
likely the person is to retire. To interpret this specification, recall that
the principal difference between this probit specification and the option
value model is the use of assumed parameter values to calculate the option
value variable used in the probit model. If this probit specification were
estimated using the optimized option value model parameters discussed below
(table 2) and if the intercept were forced to be zero, then the probit model(22)
would essentially reproduce the option value model, except for the
heteroskedastic disturbance term incorporated in the option value model.
The addition of age (specification 2) substantially improves the model
fit, but as is shown in the graphical comparison below, this specification has
little behavioral relevance.
Specifications 3 through 9 are intended to parallel the specification
used by Hausman and Wise [1985) in their proportional hazard model of
retirement. The probit model is a one period counterpart to the Hausman and
Wise analysis that followed older workers for ten years, covering 5 two-year
periods. Their analysis relied solely on SS wealth and SS accrual (plus other
personal attributes), however; they had no firm pension data. Specification S
shows that both SS and pension accrual are associated with continued
employment, but the estimated coefficients would suggest substantial
difference in the magnitude of the effects; the SS accrual coefficient is two
and one-half times as large as the pension coefficient (-21.43 versus -8.64).
(When the SS and the pension wealth and accrual variables are combined
(specifications 5 and 7), however, the estimated effects are much closer to
the pension than the SS effects.) Neither the SS nor the pension wealth
coeffthient is significantly different from zero, although both are positive.
The exclusion of the SS variables has little effect on the estimated
effects of pension wealth and accrual (specification 9 versus 8), but the
exclusion of the pension variables has a substantial effect on the estimated
SS effects (specification 10 versus 8). This suggests that other estimates of
the effects of SS on retirement, such as those in Hausman and Wise, nay be
biased because they do not control for firm pension benefits. Hausman and
Wise, for example, find a strong estimated effect of both SS present value and(23)
SS accrual, but they do not have data on the corresponding pension values. In
addition, the x2 sample statistics show that the specifications with the
pension variables fit the sample data much better than the specification with
only SS variables (specifications 8 and 9 versus 10). And with only SS
variables, the effect of the window plan cannot be predicted, except by
assuming that the effect of pension accrual or wealth is the same as the
corresponding SS effect. Specification 8 shows that this is far from accurate
in this case.
Higher expected wage earnings prolong labor force participation,
according to these results.
Likelihood values and two x2 statistics are shown at the bottom of the
table. Aside from the specification that explicitly includes age, the highest
likelihood value is obtained using expected wage earnings for the coming year
and SS and pension wealth and accruals (specification 8). The sample
statistic compares predicted versus actual departure rates by age, based on
the 1980 data used in the estimation. The window x2 statistic compares
predicted versus actual departure rates by age under the 1982 window plan.
2. The Option Value Model.
Parameter estimates from the option value model are shown in the first
two columns of table 2. The income parameter y(therisk aversion parameter
in U(Y5) —+ w5)is 0.612, suggesting essentially risk neutral
preferences. The estimated value of k in Ur(Bs) —(k35(r))7+is1.477,
implying that a dollar without working is worth more than a dollar with work,
although the estimate is not significantly different from 1. The estimated(24)
value of ,0.895,suggests that future expected or promised income is rather
highly discounted relative to income now.
3.Dynamic Programming Model.
The estimated parameters based on the dynamic programming decision rule
are shown in the remaining columns of table 2. In general, the estimates are
similar to those based on the option value rule. The estimated value of -yin
the extreme value version (specification 2) is close to, and not significantly
different from, one, implying that individuals are risk neutral (that utility
is linear in income). The normal version (specification 5) also yields an
estimated ythatis not significantly different from one, but is substantially
larger than the option value estimate (1.19 versus 0.61). Like the option
value results, the dynamic programming results suggest that the value of
income together with retirement is substantially greater than the value of
income together with work, although the dynamic programming models yield
larger estimated values of k. And like the option value estimates the dynamic
programming estimates indicate that future income is substantially discounted
relative to current income in the determination of retirement. The normal
specifications yield discount factors close to the option value estimates; the
extreme value specification implies larger discount rates.
Estimates of the models including randqm individual components are
reported as specifications (3) and (6). In neither case does inclusion of
random individual effects significantly affect other parameter estimates. In
the normal version, the variance of the individual effect is not significantly
different from zero, implying no variation in taste for retirement versus work
among these employees. The extreme value version suggests variation that is(25)
significantly different from zero and the specification fits the data somewhat
better than the specifications without the individual component. In neither
case does the individual component noticeably improve the prediction of the
window plan effects.
Based on the likelihood values the more forward looking models fit the
data better than the probit specifications, with the exception of the probit
with age. Overall, there is little difference in the likelihood values of the
option value and the dynamic programming specifications.
The most informative x2 statistics pertain to the prediction of departure
rates under the 1982 window plan. In this case the forward looking models
predict actual departure rates substantially better than the probit
specifications.
B.Graphical Comparisons.
1.The Option Value versus Dynamic Programming Results.
The easiest way to compare the models is by graphing their implied
departure rates. The option value results (model (2) in Table 2) are used as
a base for comparison and the relevant results are shown in figures la and lb.
Figure la shows the within sample fit. Departure (hazard) rates by age are
shown in the top panel. The cumulative departures implied by the departures
by age are shown in the bottom panel. For example, according to the observed
departure rates, 72.0 percent of persons employed at age 50 would have left
the firm by age 62; based on the predicted departure rates the cumulative
percent is 77.7. In general, the predicted departure rates correspond closely
to the actual rates. For example, like the actual rates, the predicted rates
show substantial jumps at 55, 60, and 62, all of which correspond to specific(26)
pension plan and SS provisions as described in appendix A. A noticeable
exception occurs at age 65; among the small proportion of employees still in
the firm at that age a much larger proportion leaves the firm than the model
predicts. This finding is common to all employee groups and to all versions
of the option value model that we have estimated to date. It is apparently
due to an "age-65-retirement-effect" that is unrelated to earnings or
retirement benefits.
As a test of the predictive validity of the model, the estimates based on
1980 departure rates have been used to predict departure rates under the 1982
window plan. The departure rates of persons offered the window plan bonus
were typically about twice as high as they were without this special
incentive. Predicted versus actual rates under the window plan are shownin
figureib, together with 1981 actual rates. Like the actual rates, the
predicted rates under the window plan are much higher than the 1981 rates.
Thus in general the model predicts an effect that is comparable in order of
magnitude to the actual effect. The option value model, however, tends to
overpredict departure rates for persons between 55 and 58 and to underpredict
rates for those between 63 and 65. Because departures between 55 and 58 are
overpredictad, the predicted cumulative departures are higher than the actual
cumulative rates through age 62, as shown in the bottom panel of the figure.
(The actual and predicted departure rates used in figures la and lb are shown
inappendix tables B-la and B-lb.)
For comparison, the same graphs are reproduced in figures 2a and 2b, but
with the extreme value dynamic programming (specification 2) predictions
added. The two models yield very similar results. Although the likelihood
values from the two models are about the same,thedynamicprogrammingwithin(27)
sample measure of fit is better than the option value measure (as shown in
table 2) and this is reflected in figure 2a. In particular, the dynamic
programming model fits departure rates between 55 and 59 somewhat better than
the option value model does. Thus the implied cumulative rates from the
dynamic programming model track the actual rates better than the option value
model predictions do.
On the other hand, departure rates under the window plan (figure 2b) are
predicted better by the option value than by the dynamic programming model,
although the differences are not large. The dynamic programming
overprediccion of departure rates between 55 and 59 is greater than the option
value overprediction at these ages. In addition the dynamic programming model
overpredicts departure rates through age 63 as well, while the option value
model underpredicts departure rates beginning at age 61. (The actual and
predicted departure rates used in figures 2a and 2b are shown in appendix
tables Z-2a and B-2b.)
The extreme value and the normal versions of the dynamic programming
model are compared in figures 3a and 3b. As the figures show, there is little
difference between the predictions from the twospecifications,although the
normal version fits actual departure rates under the window plan somewhat
better than the extreme value version. The normalmodel sample statistic
is slightly larger than the extreme value statistic, but the normal x2window
statistic is lower than the corresponding extreme value statistic, as shown in
table 2.
The three models are compared in figure 4.The figure shows the
difference between the 1982 and 1980 predicted departure rates based on the
three models, versus the difference between the actual 1982 and 1980 rates.(28)
As the previous figures suggest, the three models yield very similar results,
although the option value model tends to underestimate the effects of the
window plan whereas the dynamic programming models tend to overestimate the
effects.
In summary: in accordance with the actual effect of the window plan,
both the option value and the dynamic programming models predict a large
increase in departure rates under the window plan. This comparison does not
suggest to us that one model is noticeably better or worse than the other.
2. Selected Probit )(odel Results.
The graphs confirm that the probit models are typically inferior to the
more behavioral forward-looking models. But probit specifications that
include forward-looking variables capture some of the important features of
the option value and the dynamic programming rules. The results of the probit
model using the calculated option value variable (computed with —l, k—l and
fi—.95)are graphed in figures 5a and Sb. This specification shows very little
variation in retirement rates with age, as shown in the top panel of figure
5a, and the implied cumulative rates yield a poor approximation to the actual
rates. The model predicts very little response to the window plan.
By using both the calculated option value variable and age it is possible
to fit the observed departure rates well, as shown in figure 6a. But this
specification has essentially no behavioral implications: as revealed in
figure 6b, there is almost no predicted response to the windnw plan.
The probit specification with the best fit (excluding the specification
with age) is based on the current present value of SS and pension benefit
entitlements (accumulated SS and pension wealth), the accrual in SS and(29)
pension wealth if the person works another year, and expected wage income if
the person works another year (specification 8 in table 1). This model fits
the sample data about as well as the forward looking models; indeed it yields
a lower within sample x2 statistic than these more behavioral models.
Essentially the same results are obtained when the SS and pension wealth
variables are excluded (specification 6 in table 1).
But both of these probit specifications greatly overpredict retirement
rates under the window plan, as shown in figures 7b and 8b. The window
statistics also show that the forward looking models predict the window plan
departure rates much better than the probit models do. Aside from the details
of functional form, the basic difference between the models is that the probit
specification assumes that retirement decisions are based on a rule that
involves looking ahead only one period, whereas the option value and the
dynamic programming rules consider all future potential retirement dates. In
this instance at least, a rule that incorporates evaluation of events in the
foreseeable future is more consistent with individual behavior than one that
limits consideration to events in the next year only.
IV. A Simulation: the elimination of the Social Security early retirement.
As a further comparison of the models, we have simulated the effect of
removing the SS early retirement option, so that SS benefits are only
available beginning at age 65. A comparison of predicted retirement rates
with and without the SS early retirement is shown in Table 3 by model forages
60 through 65.
According to the simulation based on the option value model, eliminating
Social Security early retirement reduces predicted retirement rates among(30)
persons 62 through 64 by about 23 percent. The extreme value dynamic
programming specification shows noticeably larger effects, but the effects
based on the normal dynamic programming specification are smaller than the
option value estimated effects.
Because a large proportion of employees in this firm have already left
the firm before 62, the reduction applies to only the small proportion of
employees who are still working and thus the effect on the overall retirement
is small. To the extent that these reductions generalize to workers not
covered by defined benefit plans .with incentives for early retirement, these
estimates suggest that an increase in the SS early retirementage would have a
very substantial effect on labor force participation. A large proportion of
retired persons rely almost exclusively on SS benefits for retirement income.
According to these estimates, substantially fever of these employees would
leave the labor force if they could not collect SS benefits.
Because of data limitations, it has been common to useparameter
estimates from models that exclude firm pension plan data to simulate the
effect of changes in SS provisions. To demonstrate thepotential effect of
the exclusion of firm plans, we have estimated the.dynamic programming normal
model (specification 5) using only SS benefits -- insteadof SS and the firm
pension benefits -- andthese estimates have been used to simulate the effect
of the elimination of SS early retirement. The resultsare shown in table 4.
compared to the dynamic programming normal estimates. The estimated effect of
the elimination of SS early retirement is muchgreater when the firm pension
is not accounted for. For example, the retirement rate at 62 is reduced from
.291 to .081; the base model yields a reduction from .241to 205.(31)
V. Summary.
Wehave compared the in-sample and out-of-sample predictiveperformance
of three models of retirement. The goal was to determine which of the
retirement rules most closely matched observed retirement behavior ina large
firm.Theprimary measure of predictive validity was the correspondence
between the model predictions of retirement behavior and actual retirement
under the firm window plan. Model parameter estimates were obtained basedon
retirement in 1980. These estimates were then used to predict retirementin
1982 when the window plan was in effect. Retirementrates of persons eligible
for the window plan bonus typically doubled in 1982,compared to earlier (and
later) years.
The option value and the dynamic programming models fit thesample data
equally well, with a slight advantage to the normal dynamicprogramming model.
Both models correctly predicted a very large increase in retirementunder the
window plan, with some advantage in fit to the option value model. Inshort,
this evidence suggests that the option value and dynamicprogramming models
are considerably more successful than the less complex probit model in
approximating the rules individuals use to make retirement decisions, but that
the more complex dynamic programming rule approximates behaviorno better than
the simpler option value rule. More definitive conclusions will haveto await
accumulated evidence based on additional comparisons using different data sets
and with respect to different pension plan provisions.(32)
Appendix A
The Firm Retirement Plan
To understand the effect of the pension plan provisions, Figure A-i shows
the expected future compensation of a person from our sample who is 50 years
old and has been employed by the firm for 20 years. For convenience, Figure
A-l assumes a 5 percent real discount rate and zero inflation. In the
estimated model reported in Section III, the discount rate is estimated and
the inflation rate is assumed to be 5 percent. Total compensation from the
firm can be viewed as the sum of wage earnings, the accrual of pension
benefits, and the accrual of Social Security benefits. (This omits medical
and other unobserved benefits that should be included as compensation, but on
which we do not have data.) As compensation for working another year the
employee receives salary earnings. He also receives compensation in the form
of future pension benefits. The annual compensation in this form is the
change in the present value of the future pension benefits entitlement, due to
working an additional year. This accrual is comparable to wage earnings. The
accrual of Social Security benefits also may be calculated in a similar
manner, and is also comparable to wage earnings. Figure A-i shows the present
value at age 50 of expected future compensation in all three forms. The line
labelled wage earnings represents cumulated earnings, byage of retirement
(more precisely, by age of departure from the firm, since some workers might
well continue to work in another job). For example, if theperson were to
retire at age 62, his cumulated earnings betweenage 50 and age 62, discounted
to age 50 dollars would be about $144,000. The slope of the earnings line
represents annual earnings discounted to age 50 dollars.(33)
The solid line shows the accrual of firmpensionplus Social Security
benefits, again discounted to age 50 dollars. The shape of this profile is
determined primarily by the pension plan provisions. Theplan's normal
retirement age is 65 and the early retirementage is 55. Cliff vesting occurs
at ten years of service. Normal retirement benefits atage 65 are determined
by age times years of service, multiplied by some constant factor. Themost
important additional provisions -- thosethat determine the shape of the
profile in Figure A-i -- aredescribed here; full details of the plan
provisions are presented in Kotlikoff and Wise [1987]. Thepresent value of
retirement benefits increases between 50 and 54 becauseyears of service, and
possibly earnings, increase. An employee could leave the firm atage 53, for
example. If he were to do that, and if he were vested in the firm'spension
plan he would be entitled to normal retirement pension benefits atage 65,
based on his years of service and current dollarearnings at age 53. He could
start to receive benefits as early as age 55, the pension early retirement
age, but the benefit amount would be reduced actuarially. Thus in present
value terms, the stream of benefits received beginning at 55 would beequal to
the stream of benefits beginning at 65; the annual benefitamount would be
reduced just enough to offset the receipt of benefits for tenmore years. If
he started to receive benefits atage 55, they would be only 36 percent of the
dollar amount he would receive at age 65. If, however, hewere to remain in
the firm until the early retirementage, the situation would be quite
different. He would be entitled to normal retirement benefits basedon his
years of service and salary at age 55. But, if he were to start to receive
them at age 55, the benefits would be reduced less thanactuarially, about 3(34)
percent for each year that retirement precedes age 65, instead of 6 or 7
percent.
In addition, the plan has a Social Security offset provision. Pension
benefits are offset by a specified amount, depending on the firm estimate of
Social Security benefits. But if the person takes early retirement, between
55 and 65, the Social Security offset is not applied to benefits received
before age 65. These two provisions create the large discontinuous jump in
retirement benefits at age 55 --fromabout $33,000 to $56,000. This increase
is equivalent to more than 130 percent on his annual wage earnings at 55. Thus
there is an enormous bonus for remaining with the firm until that age. After
age 55, however, the person who does not retire foregoes the opportunity of
taking pension benefits on very advantageous terms. Thus the minimal change
in the discounted value of benefits between 55 and 60.
If a person has 30 years of service at age 60, he is entitled to full
normal retirement benefits. No early retirement reduction is applied to
benefits if they are taken then. That is, by continuing to work he will no
longer gain from fewer years of early retirement reduction, as he did before
age 60. Thus the kink in the profile and the decline thereafter.
The top line shows total compensation. For example, if the employee were
to leave the firm at age 60, his wage earnings between 50 and 60 would be
$126,000, shown by the wage earnings line. Thereafter, he would receive firm
pension plan and Social Security retirement benefits with a present value --
atage 50 --ofabout $58,000. The sum of the two is about $184,000, shown by
the top line. The large jump at 55 reflects the early retirement provisions
of the pension plan. Total compensation declines modestly each year through
age 60 and very rapidly thereafter. After age 62 or 63, annual total











































































































































































































Tabulations of Predicted and Actual Retirement Rates
This Appendix presents tabulations of the values presented graphically in
Figures 1-2. These figures are the predicted and actual retirement rates, or
hazard rates, for the employees in the data set, and the associated cumulative
retirement rates.
The actual retirement rates for each age group are the fraction of
workers of that age who retire during the indicated year. The predicted
retirement rates are the aggregate rates predicted by the indicated model;
that is, the predicted retirement rate is the average predicted probability of
retiring for all workers of the indicated age.
The cumulative retirement rates are computed from the single-year
retirement rates by following a cohort of 100 50-year olds at the firm for the
next 20 years, assuming that the annual retirement rates for this cohort are
the same as the annual retirement rates for the indicated year, predicted or
actual as the case may be. For example, in 1980 the actual retirement rates
(in our sample of 993 workers) of 50, 51. and 52 year olds were respectively
.00, .022, and .054. Thus the cumulative retirement rate for 52-year olds is
1 -(l-.00)(l-.022)(l-.054)—.075.
The numbering of the tables in this appendix corresponds to the numbering
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Note: The actualretirementrates were computed for the 1000 persons in the
sample.The predicted retirement rates arebasedon option value model 2.Table B-lb
Figure lb data.
CumulativeRetirement Rates AnnualRetirementRates
Actual Actual Predicted Actual Actual Predicted
Age 1981 1982 1982 1981 1982 1982
50 .000 .000 .023 .000 .000 .023
51 .036 .022 .042 .036 .022 .019
52 .036 .022 .053 .000 .000 .012
53 .036 .044 .059 .000 .023 .006
54 .052 .044 .062 .017 .000 .003
55 .139 .126 .192 .091 .085 .139
56 .195 .163 .323 .066 .043 .162
57 .249 .251 .480 .066 .105 .232
58 .276 .382 .635 .036 .175 .299
59 .286 .600 .758 .014 .352 .335
60 .366 .770 .860 .113 .425 .424
61 .467 .887 .923 .159 .508 .448
62 .617 .951 .961 .281 .566 .498
63 .723 .983 .978 .276 .652 .444
64 .824 .995 .988 .367 .714 .445
65 .930 .999 .993 .600 .895 .454
66 .953 1.000 .996 .333 .700 .449
Note: Based on 1980 option value model 2 parameter estimates, reported in













































































































































Cwiulative Retirement Rates Annual RetirementRates
Predicted Predicted
Predicted Dynamic Predicted Dynamic
ActualActualOption ProgrammingActual ActualOptionProgramming
Age1981 1982Value 1982 1982 1981 1982 Value 1982 1982
.600 .895
.333 .700
50 .000 .000 .023 .021 .000 .000 .023 .021
51 .036 .022 .042 .043 .036 .022 .019 .022
52 .036 .022 .053 .062 .000 .000 .012 .020
53 .036 .044 .059 .082 .000 .023 .006 .022
54 .052 .044 .062 .103 .017 .000 .003 .023
55 .139 .126 .192 .199 .091 .085 .139 .107
56 .195 .163 .323 .329 .066 .043 .162 .162
57 .249 .251 .480 .506 .066 .105 .232 .264
58 .276 .382 .635 .696 .036 .175 .299 .384
59 .286 .600 .758 .827 .014 .352 .335 .430
60 .366 .770 .860 .917 .113 .425 .424 .524
61 .467 .887 .923 .967 .159 .508 .448 .604
62 .617 .951 .961 .990 .281 .566 .498 .703
63 .723 .983 .978 .997 .276 .652 .444 .693
64 .824 .995 .988 .999 .367 .714 .445 .622
65930 .999 .993 .999 .454 .543
66 .953 1.000 .996 1.000 .449 .457(36)
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Probitparameter estimates
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Inc. 0.70 3.i1 3.0? —1.71 1.$1 2.66 3.21 0.94
(0.28)(0.70)(0.70)(0.34)(0.33)(0.79)(0.16)(0.31)
53pv 0.69 0.90 2.79
(0.08) (1.09) (0.71)
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59.1 33.3 179.3 64.6 65.3 29.1 31.1 28.2 38.2 143.9
2
180.3 108.2 312.2191.2 164.9 76.4 13.6 67.3 37.3229.7
Notes:Estimation is by mimuui likelihood. Allmonetaryvaluesare in $100,000
(1980 dollars). The x2salII)lestatisticis the chi-squared statistic relative to
the predicted versti.s actual ntamber of retirementsby age in the estimation sample;
the xwindowstatistic is the corresponding statistic for predicted versus actual
retirement under the windowplan. Standard errorsare in parenthesis.
*The window plan bonus istreated as a one-time addition to income.Table 2
Paraa.t.r•stimatsa for the option value end the dynamic
programming models.
Ootion Vclue Models Ex
Prosrammine Kodd,

















































































Notes: Estimation is by maximum likelihood. The option value model is described in
Section II.A andthe ztochaticdynamicprogrammingmodel is described in Section
II.C. All monetary values arein$l00000 (1980 dollars). See the notes to Table 1.
*Parametervalue imposed.Table 3
Retirementrates in 1980 with andwithont SSearly retir.ment
0tionValue
DynamicProgrsittg
Probit Extreme Value Normal
Age WithWithoutWithWithoutWithWithoutWithWithout
60 .233 .229 .188 .172 .214 .199 .249 .242
61 .204 .197 .176 .142 .190 .170 .206 .201
62 .262 .218 .269 .177 .241 .205 .175 .136
63 .313 .258 .314 .214 .277 .240 .227 .155
64 .360 .296 .305 .230 .284 .258 .281 .175
65 .346 .346 .320 .320 .314 .314 .375 .375
Notes: The entries arethepredicted retirement rates from maxiaum likelihood
estimates of option valuemodel (2). dynamic progra.ing model(2). dynamic
programming model (5),and probit specification (8). See notes to tables 1 and 2.With refersto thebase(current) specification.Without estimates are
from a simulation that eliminates th. possibility of SS receipt as early as age
62.Under thesimulation, SS benefit receipt begins at age 65.Detailsare
providedin the text.Table 4
P..tiransnt rates in 1980with andwithout SS sarly r.tirement comparison vith
sstizatss based on SS only, using dynamic progrsing normal specification.
Dynamic Pro grainsNormal
8ase (SS& PensionD,ta)
Age With Without With
SS Only
Without
60 .214 .199 .114 .057
61 .190 .170 .167 .067
62 .241 .205 .291 .081
63 .277 .240 .310 .118
64 .284 .258 .334 .191
65 .314 .314 .356 .356Figure la. Predicted versus actual 1980 departure
rates and implicit cumulative departures, by age:
option value model (2).
0
60 62 64 56 58
Age
60 62 84 66
58
AgeFigure lb. Predicted versus actual departure rates and
implicit cumulative departures under the 1982 window plan,
based on 1980 parameter estimates, and 1981 actual rates:







50 62 54 66 68
Age
60 62 64 66
0
60 62 54 66 68 60 62 64 66
AgeFigure 2a. Predictedversus actual 1980 departure rates
and implicitcumulative departures, by age:optionvalue














62 64 66 68 60 62 64 66
Age
0
50 52 64 66 58 60 62 64 66Figure 2b. Predicted versus actual departure rates and implicit
cumulative departures under the 1982 window plan, based on
1980 parameter estimates, and 1981 actual rates: option value




















/Figure 3a. Predicted versus actual 1980 departure rates and
implicit cumulative departures, dynamic programming model,
by age: extreme value distribution (model 2) and









60 52 54 56 58
Age
60 62 64 66
52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66
AgeFigure 3b. Predicted versus actual departure rates and
implicit cumulative departures under the 1982 window plan,
based on 1980 parameter estimates, and 1981 actual rates:
dynamic programming model 2 (extreme value distribution)
and model 5 (normal distribution).
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Figure 4. Actual and predicted increases in retirement rates
under the 1982 window plan: option value model, SDP—extreme







I I I I
59 61 63 66
AgeFigure 5a. Predicted versus actual departure rates and
implicit cumulative departures, by age: probit model (1).
Age
• 60 62 64 56 58 60 62 64 66
AgeFigure 5b. Predicted versus actual departure rates and
implicit cumulative departures under the 1982 window
plan, based on 1980 parameter estimates, and 1981
actual rates: probit model (1).
60 62 64 56 58
Age
60 62 64 66
0
50 52 54 56 68 60 62 64 66
AgeFigure 6a. Predicted versus actual departure rates and
implicit cumulative departures, by age: probit model (2).
0
60 52 54 66 68
Age
60 62 64 66
0
60 52 64 56 58 60 62 64 66
AgeFigure 6b. Predicted versus actual departure rates and
implicit cumulative departures under the 1982 window
plan, based on 1980 parameter estimates, and 1981
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AgoFigure 7a. Predicted versus actual departure rates and









60 62 64 66 68
Age
60 62 64 66
62 54 66 68 60 62 64 66
AgeFigure 7b. Predicted versus actual departure rates and
implicit cumulative departures under the 1982 window
plan, based on 1980 parameter estimates, and 1981
actual rates: probit model (6).
0
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Age
60 62 64 66
0
60 62 54 56 68 60 62 64 66
AgeFigure 8a. Predicted versus actual departure rates and
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Age
60 62 64 66
0
60 52 64 56 68 60 62 64 66Figure 8b. Predicted versus actual departure rates and
implicit cumulative departures under the 1982 window
plan, based on 1980 parameter estimates, and 1981
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